Berkshire’sCorporatePerformancevs.theS&P500 AnnualPercentageChange Year inPer-Share BookValueof Berkshire (1) inS&P500 withDividends Included (2) Relative Results (1)-(2) 1965 ................................................... 23.810.013.8 1966 ................................................... 20.3(11.7)32.0 1967 ................................................... 11.030.9(19.9) 1968 ................................................... 19.011.08.0 1969 ................................................... 16.2(8.4)24.6 1970 ................................................... 12.03.98.1 1971 ................................................... 16.414.61.8 1972 ................................................... 21.718.92.8 1973 ...................................................4.7 (14.8)19.5 1974 ...................................................5.5 (26.4)31.9 1975 ................................................... 21.937.2(15.3) 1976 ................................................... 59.323.635.7 1977 ................................................... 31.9(7.4)39.3 1978 ................................................... 24.06.417.6 1979 ................................................... 35.718.217.5 1980 ................................................... 19.332.3(13.0) 1981 ................................................... 31.4(5.0)36.4 1982 ................................................... 40.021.418.6 1983 ................................................... 32.322.49.9 1984 ................................................... 13.66.17.5 1985 ................................................... 48.231.616.6 1986 ................................................... 26.118.67.5 1987 ................................................... 19.55.114.4 1988 ................................................... 20.116.63.5 1989 ................................................... 44.431.712.7 1990 ...................................................7.4 (3.1)10.5 1991 ................................................... 39.630.59.1 1992 ................................................... 20.37.612.7 1993 ................................................... 14.310.14.2 1994 ................................................... 13.91.312.6 1995 ................................................... 43.137.65.5 1996 ................................................... 31.823.08.8 1997 ................................................... 34.133.4.7 1998 ................................................... 48.328.619.7 1999 ....................................................5 21.0(20.5) 2000 ...................................................6.5 (9.1)15.6 2001 ................................................... (6.2)(11.9)5.7 2002 ................................................... 10.0(22.1)32.1 2003 ................................................... 21.028.7(7.7) 2004 ................................................... 10.510.9(.4) 2005 ...................................................6.44.91.5 2006 ................................................... 18.415.82.6 2007 ................................................... 11.05.55.5 2008 ................................................... (9.6)(37.0)27.4 2009 ................................................... 19.826.5(6.7) CompoundedAnnualGain–1965-2009 ....................... 20.3%9.3%11.0 OverallGain–1964-2009 .................................. 434,057%5,430% Notes: Dataareforcalendaryearswiththeseexceptions:1965and1966,yearended9/30;1967,15monthsended 12/31. Startingin1979,accountingrulesrequiredinsurancecompaniestovaluetheequitysecuritiestheyholdatmarket ratherthanatthelowerofcostormarket,whichwaspreviouslytherequirement.Inthistable,Berkshire’sresults through1978havebeenrestatedtoconformtothechangedrules.Inallotherrespects,theresultsarecalculatedusing thenumbersoriginallyreported. TheS&P500numbersare pre-tax whereastheBerkshirenumbersare after-tax.IfacorporationsuchasBerkshire weresimplytohaveownedtheS&P500andaccruedtheappropriatetaxes,itsresultswouldhavelaggedtheS&P500 inyearswhenthatindexshowedapositivereturn,butwouldhaveexceededtheS&P500inyearswhentheindex showedanegativereturn.Overtheyears,thetaxcostswouldhavecausedtheaggregatelagtobesubstantial. 2BERKSHIREHATHAWAYINC. TotheShareholdersofBerkshireHathawayInc.: Ourgaininnetworthduring2009was$21.8billion,whichincreasedtheper-sharebookvalueofboth ourClassAandClassBstockby19.8%.Overthelast45years(thatis,sincepresentmanagementtookover) bookvaluehasgrownfrom$19to$84,487,arateof20.3%compoundedannually.* Berkshire’srecentacquisitionofBurlingtonNorthernSantaFe(BNSF)hasaddedatleast65,000 shareholderstothe500,000orsoalreadyonourbooks.It’simportanttoCharlieMunger,mylong-timepartner, andmethat all ofourownersunderstandBerkshire’soperations,goals,limitationsandculture.Ineachannual report,consequently,werestatetheeconomicprinciplesthatguideus.Thisyeartheseprinciplesappearonpages 89-94andIurgeallofyou–butparticularlyournewshareholders–toreadthem.Berkshirehasadheredtothese principlesfordecadesandwillcontinuetodosolongafterI’mgone. Inthisletterwewillalsoreviewsomeofthebasicsofourbusiness,hopingtoprovidebothafreshman orientationsessionforourBNSFnewcomersandarefreshercourseforBerkshireveterans. HowWeMeasureOurselves Ourmetricsforevaluatingourmanagerialperformancearedisplayedonthefacingpage.Fromthestart, CharlieandIhavebelievedinhavingarationalandunbendingstandardformeasuringwhatwehave–orhave not–accomplished.Thatkeepsusfromthetemptationofseeingwherethearrowofperformancelandsand then paintingthebull’seyearoundit. SelectingtheS&P500asourbogeywasaneasychoicebecauseourshareholders,atvirtuallynocost,can matchitsperformancebyholdinganindexfund.Whyshouldtheypayusformerelyduplicatingthatresult? AmoredifficultdecisionforuswashowtomeasuretheprogressofBerkshireversustheS&P.Thereare goodargumentsforsimplyusingthechangeinourstockprice.Overanextendedperiodoftime,infact,thatis thebesttest.Butyear-to-yearmarketpricescanbeextraordinarilyerratic.Evenevaluationscoveringaslongasa decadecanbegreatlydistortedbyfoolishlyhighorlowpricesatthebeginningorendofthemeasurement period.SteveBallmer,ofMicrosoft,andJeffImmelt,ofGE,cantellyouaboutthatproblem,sufferingastheydo fromthenosebleedpricesatwhichtheirstockstradedwhentheywerehandedthemanagerialbaton. TheidealstandardformeasuringouryearlyprogresswouldbethechangeinBerkshire’sper-shareintrinsic value.Alas,thatvaluecannotbecalculatedwithanythingclosetoprecision,soweinsteaduseacrudeproxyfor it:per-sharebookvalue.Relyingonthisyardstickhasitsshortcomings,whichwediscussonpages92and93. Additionally,bookvalueatmostcompaniesunderstatesintrinsicvalue,andthatiscertainlythecaseat Berkshire.Inaggregate,ourbusinessesareworthconsiderablymorethanthevaluesatwhichtheyarecarriedon ourbooks.Inourall-importantinsurancebusiness,moreover,thedifferenceishuge.Evenso,CharlieandI believethatourbookvalue–understatedthoughitis–suppliesthemostusefultrackingdeviceforchangesin intrinsicvalue.Bythismeasurement,astheopeningparagraphofthisletterstates,ourbookvaluesincethestart offiscal1965hasgrownatarateof20.3%compoundedannually. *Allper-sharefiguresusedinthisreportapplytoBerkshire’sAshares.FiguresfortheBsharesare 1/1500th ofthoseshownforA. 3Weshouldnotethathadweinsteadchosen marketprices asouryardstick,Berkshire’sresultswould lookbetter,showingagainsincethestartoffiscal1965of22%compoundedannually.Surprisingly,thismodest differenceinannualcompoundingrateleadstoan801,516%market-valuegainfortheentire45-yearperiod comparedtothebook-valuegainof434,057%(shownonpage2).Ourmarketgainisbetterbecausein1965 Berkshiresharessoldatanappropriatediscounttothebookvalueofitsunderearningtextileassets,whereas todayBerkshiresharesregularlysellatapremiumtotheaccountingvaluesofitsfirst-classbusinesses. Summedup,thetableonpage2conveysthreemessages,twopositiveandonehugelynegative.First, wehaveneverhad any five-yearperiodbeginningwith1965-69andendingwith2005-09–andtherehavebeen 41ofthese–duringwhichourgaininbookvaluedidnotexceedtheS&P’sgain.Second,thoughwehavelagged theS&Pinsomeyearsthatwerepositiveforthemarket,wehaveconsistentlydonebetterthantheS&Pinthe elevenyearsduringwhichitdeliverednegativeresults.Inotherwords,ourdefensehasbeenbetterthanour offense,andthat’slikelytocontinue. Thebigminusisthatourperformanceadvantagehasshrunkdramaticallyasoursizehasgrown,an unpleasanttrendthatis certain tocontinue.Tobesure,Berkshirehasmanyoutstandingbusinessesandacadreof trulygreatmanagers,operatingwithinanunusualcorporateculturethatletsthemmaximizetheirtalents.Charlie andIbelievethesefactorswillcontinuetoproducebetter-than-averageresultsovertime.Buthugesumsforge theirownanchorandourfutureadvantage,ifany,willbeasmallfractionofourhistoricaledge. WhatWeDon’tDo Longago,Charlielaidouthisstrongestambition:“AllIwanttoknowiswhereI’mgoingtodie,soI’ll nevergothere.”ThatbitofwisdomwasinspiredbyJacobi,thegreatPrussianmathematician,whocounseled “Invert,alwaysinvert”asanaidtosolvingdifficultproblems.(Icanreportaswellthatthisinversionapproach worksonalessloftylevel:Singacountrysonginreverse,andyouwillquicklyrecoveryourcar,houseand wife.) HereareafewexamplesofhowweapplyCharlie’sthinkingatBerkshire: •CharlieandIavoidbusinesseswhosefutureswecan’tevaluate,nomatterhowexcitingtheir productsmaybe.Inthepast,itrequirednobrillianceforpeopletoforeseethefabulousgrowth thatawaitedsuchindustriesasautos(in1910),aircraft(in1930)andtelevisionsets(in1950).But thefuturethenalsoincludedcompetitivedynamicsthatwoulddecimatealmostallofthe companiesenteringthoseindustries.Eventhesurvivorstendedtocomeawaybleeding. JustbecauseCharlieandIcanclearlyseedramaticgrowthaheadforanindustrydoesnotmean wecanjudgewhatitsprofitmarginsandreturnsoncapitalwillbeasahostofcompetitorsbattle forsupremacy.AtBerkshirewewillstickwithbusinesseswhoseprofitpicturefordecadesto comeseemsreasonablypredictable.Eventhen,wewillmakeplentyofmistakes. •Wewillneverbecomedependentonthekindnessofstrangers.Too-big-to-failisnotafallback positionatBerkshire.Instead,wewillalwaysarrangeouraffairssothatanyrequirementsforcash wemayconceivablyhavewillbedwarfedbyourownliquidity.Moreover,thatliquiditywillbe constantlyrefreshedbyagusherofearningsfromourmanyanddiversebusinesses. WhenthefinancialsystemwentintocardiacarrestinSeptember2008,Berkshirewasa supplier ofliquidityandcapitaltothesystem,notasupplicant.Attheverypeakofthecrisis,wepoured $15.5billionintoabusinessworldthatcouldotherwiselookonlytothefederalgovernmentfor help.Ofthat,$9billionwenttobolstercapitalatthreehighly-regardedandpreviously-secure Americanbusinessesthatneeded– withoutdelay –ourtangiblevoteofconfidence.Theremaining $6.5billionsatisfiedourcommitmenttohelpfundthepurchaseofWrigley,adealthatwas completedwithoutpausewhile,elsewhere,panicreigned. 4Wepayasteeppricetomaintainourpremierfinancialstrength.The$20billion-plusofcash- equivalentassetsthatwecustomarilyholdisearningapittanceatpresent.Butwesleepwell. •Wetendtoletourmanysubsidiariesoperateontheirown,withoutoursupervisingand monitoringthemtoanydegree.Thatmeanswearesometimeslateinspottingmanagement problemsandthatbothoperatingandcapitaldecisionsareoccasionallymadewithwhichCharlie andIwouldhavedisagreedhadwebeenconsulted.Mostofourmanagers,however,usethe independencewegrantthemmagnificently,rewardingourconfidencebymaintaininganowner- orientedattitudethatisinvaluableandtooseldomfoundinhugeorganizations.Wewouldrather sufferthevisiblecostsofafewbaddecisionsthanincurthemanyinvisiblecoststhatcomefrom decisionsmadetooslowly–ornotatall–becauseofastiflingbureaucracy. WithouracquisitionofBNSF,wenowhaveabout257,000employeesandliterallyhundredsof differentoperatingunits.Wehopetohavemanymoreofeach.ButwewillneverallowBerkshire tobecomesomemonoliththatisoverrunwithcommittees,budgetpresentationsandmultiple layersofmanagement.Instead,weplantooperateasacollectionofseparately-managedmedium- sizedandlargebusinesses,mostofwhosedecision-makingoccursattheoperatinglevel.Charlie andIwilllimitourselvestoallocatingcapital,controllingenterpriserisk,choosingmanagersand settingtheircompensation. •WemakenoattempttowooWallStreet.Investorswhobuyandsellbaseduponmediaoranalyst commentaryarenotforus.Insteadwewant partners whojoinusatBerkshirebecausetheywish tomakealong-terminvestmentina business theythemselvesunderstandandbecauseit’sonethat followspolicieswithwhichtheyconcur.IfCharlieandIweretogointoasmallventurewitha fewpartners,wewouldseekindividualsinsyncwithus,knowingthatcommongoalsandashared destinymakeforahappybusiness“marriage”betweenownersandmanagers.Scalinguptogiant sizedoesn’tchangethattruth. Tobuildacompatibleshareholderpopulation,wetrytocommunicatewithourownersdirectly andinformatively.Ourgoalistotellyouwhatwewouldliketoknowifourpositionswere reversed.Additionally,wetrytopostourquarterlyandannualfinancialinformationonthe Internetearlyonweekends,therebygivingyouandotherinvestorsplentyoftimeduringa non-tradingperiodtodigestjustwhathashappenedatourmulti-facetedenterprise.(Occasionally, SECdeadlinesforceanon-Fridaydisclosure.)Thesematterssimplycan’tbeadequately summarizedinafewparagraphs,nordotheylendthemselvestothekindofcatchyheadlinethat journalistssometimesseek. Lastyearwesaw,inoneinstance,howsound-bitereportingcangowrong.Amongthe12,830 wordsintheannualletterwasthissentence:“Wearecertain,forexample,thattheeconomywill beinshamblesthroughout2009–andprobablywellbeyond–butthatconclusiondoesnottellus whetherthemarketwillriseorfall.”Manynewsorganizationsreported–indeed,blared–thefirst partofthesentencewhilemakingnomentionwhatsoeverofitsending.Iregardthisasterrible journalism:MisinformedreadersorviewersmaywellhavethoughtthatCharlieandIwere forecastingbadthingsforthestockmarket,thoughwehadnotonlyinthatsentence,butalso elsewhere,madeitclearweweren’tpredictingthemarketatall.Anyinvestorswhoweremisled bythesensationalistspaidabigprice:TheDowclosedthedayoftheletterat7,063andfinished theyearat10,428. Givenafewexperienceswe’vehadlikethat,youcanunderstandwhyIpreferthatour communicationswithyouremainasdirectandunabridgedaspossible. ************ Let’smovetothespecificsofBerkshire’soperations.Wehavefourmajoroperatingsectors,each differingfromtheothersinbalancesheetandincomeaccountcharacteristics.Therefore,lumpingthemtogether, asisstandardinfinancialstatements,impedesanalysis.Sowe’llpresentthemasfourseparatebusinesses,which ishowCharlieandIviewthem. 5Insurance Ourproperty-casualty(P/C)insurancebusinesshasbeentheenginebehindBerkshire’sgrowthandwill continuetobe.Ithasworkedwondersforus.WecarryourP/Ccompaniesonourbooksat$15.5billionmore thantheirnettangibleassets,anamountlodgedinour“Goodwill”account.Thesecompanies,however,are worth far morethantheircarryingvalue–andthefollowinglookattheeconomicmodeloftheP/Cindustrywill tellyouwhy. Insurersreceivepremiumsupfrontandpayclaimslater.Inextremecases,suchasthosearisingfrom certainworkers’compensationaccidents,paymentscanstretchoverdecades.Thiscollect-now,pay-latermodel leavesusholdinglargesums–moneywecall“float”–thatwilleventuallygotoothers.Meanwhile,wegetto investthisfloatforBerkshire’sbenefit.Thoughindividualpoliciesandclaimscomeandgo,theamountoffloat weholdremainsremarkablystableinrelationtopremiumvolume.Consequently,asourbusinessgrows,sodoes ourfloat. Ifpremiumsexceedthetotalofexpensesandeventuallosses,weregisteranunderwritingprofitthat addstotheinvestmentincomeproducedfromthefloat.Thiscombinationallowsustoenjoytheuseoffree money–and,betteryet,get paid forholdingit.Alas,thehopeofthishappyresultattractsintensecompetition, sovigorousinmostyearsastocausetheP/Cindustryasawholetooperateatasignificantunderwriting loss. Thisloss,ineffect,iswhattheindustrypaystoholditsfloat.Usuallythiscostisfairlylow,butinsome catastrophe-riddenyearsthecostfromunderwritinglossesmorethaneatsuptheincomederivedfromuseof float. Inmyperhapsbiasedview,Berkshirehasthebestlargeinsuranceoperationintheworld.AndIwill absolutelystatethatwehavethebestmanagers.Ourfloathasgrownfrom$16millionin1967,whenweentered thebusiness,to$62billionattheendof2009.Moreover,wehavenowoperatedatanunderwritingprofitfor sevenconsecutiveyears.Ibelieveitlikelythatwewillcontinuetounderwriteprofitablyinmost–though certainlynotall–futureyears.Ifwedoso,ourfloatwillbecost-free,muchasifsomeonedeposited$62billion withusthatwecouldinvestforourownbenefitwithoutthepaymentofinterest. Letmeemphasizeagainthatcost-freefloatis not aresulttobeexpectedfortheP/Cindustryasa whole:Inmostyears,premiumshavebeeninadequatetocoverclaimsplusexpenses.Consequently,the industry’soverallreturnontangibleequityhasformanydecadesfallenfarshortofthatachievedbytheS&P 500.OutstandingeconomicsexistatBerkshireonlybecausewehavesomeoutstandingmanagersrunningsome unusualbusinesses.OurinsuranceCEOsdeserveyourthanks,havingaddedmanybillionsofdollarsto Berkshire’svalue.It’sapleasureformetotellyouabouttheseall-stars. ************ Let’sstartatGEICO,whichisknowntoallofyoubecauseofits$800millionannualadvertising budget(closetotwicethatoftherunner-upadvertiserintheautoinsurancefield).GEICOismanagedbyTony Nicely,whojoinedthecompanyat18.Now66,Tonystilltap-dancestotheofficeeveryday,justasIdoat79. Webothfeelluckytoworkatabusinesswelove. GEICO’scustomershavewarmfeelingstowardthecompanyaswell.Here’sproof:SinceBerkshire acquiredcontrolofGEICOin1996,itsmarketsharehasincreasedfrom2.5%to8.1%,againreflectingthenet additionofsevenmillionpolicyholders.Perhapstheycontactedusbecausetheythoughtourgeckowascute,but theyboughtfromustosaveimportantmoney.(Maybeyoucanaswell;call1-800-847-7536orgoto www.GEICO.com.)Andthey’vestayedwithusbecausetheylikeourserviceaswellasourprice. BerkshireacquiredGEICOintwostages.In1976-80weboughtaboutone-thirdofthecompany’s stockfor$47million.Overtheyears,largerepurchasesbythecompanyofitsownsharescausedourpositionto growtoabout50%withoutourhavingboughtanymoreshares.Then,onJanuary2,1996,weacquiredthe remaining50%ofGEICOfor$2.3 billion incash,about50timesthecostofouroriginalpurchase. 6AnoldWallStreetjokegetsclosetoourexperience: Customer:ThanksforputtingmeinXYZstockat5.Ihearit’supto18. Broker:Yes,andthat’sjustthebeginning.Infact,thecompanyisdoingsowellnow, thatit’sanevenbetterbuyat18thanitwaswhenyoumadeyourpurchase. Customer:Damn,IknewIshouldhavewaited. GEICO’sgrowthmayslowin2010.U.S.vehicleregistrationsareactuallydownbecauseofslumping autosales.Moreover,highunemploymentiscausingagrowingnumberofdriverstogouninsured.(That’sillegal almosteverywhere,butifyou’velostyourjobandstillwanttodrive...)Our“low-costproducer”status, however,issuretogiveussignificantgainsinthefuture.In1995,GEICOwasthecountry’ssixthlargestauto insurer;nowwearenumberthree.Thecompany’sfloathasgrownfrom$2.7billionto$9.6billion.Equally important,GEICOhasoperatedatanunderwritingprofitin13ofthe14yearsBerkshirehasownedit. IbecameexcitedaboutGEICOinJanuary1951,whenIfirstvisitedthecompanyasa20-year-old student.ThankstoTony,I’mevenmoreexcitedtoday. ************ AhugelyimportanteventinBerkshire’shistoryoccurredonaSaturdayin1985.AjitJaincameinto ourofficeinOmaha–andIimmediatelyknewwehadfoundasuperstar.(HehadbeendiscoveredbyMike Goldberg,nowelevatedtoSt.Mike.) WeimmediatelyputAjitinchargeofNationalIndemnity’ssmallandstrugglingreinsuranceoperation. Overtheyears,hehasbuiltthisbusinessintoaone-of-a-kindgiantintheinsuranceworld. Staffedtodaybyonly30people,Ajit’soperationhassetrecordsfortransactionsizeinseveralareasof insurance.Ajitwritesbillion-dollarlimits–andthenkeepseverydimeoftheriskinsteadoflayingitoffwith otherinsurers.Threeyearsago,hetookoverhugeliabilitiesfromLloyds,allowingittocleanupitsrelationship with27,972participants(“names”)whohadwrittenproblem-riddenpoliciesthatatonepointthreatenedthe survivalofthis322-year-oldinstitution.Thepremiumforthatsinglecontractwas$7.1billion.During2009,he negotiatedalifereinsurancecontractthatcouldproduce$50billionofpremiumforusoverthenext50orso years. Ajit’sbusinessisjusttheoppositeofGEICO’s.Atthatcompany,wehavemillionsofsmallpolicies thatlargelyrenewyearafteryear.Ajitwritesrelativelyfewpolicies,andthemixchangessignificantlyfromyear toyear.Throughouttheworld,heisknownasthemantocallwhensomethingbothverylargeandunusualneeds tobeinsured. IfCharlie,IandAjitareeverinasinkingboat–andyoucanonlysaveoneofus–swimtoAjit. ************ OurthirdinsurancepowerhouseisGeneralRe.Someyearsbackthisoperationwastroubled;nowitis agleamingjewelinourinsurancecrown. UndertheleadershipofTadMontross,GeneralRehadanoutstandingunderwritingyearin2009,while alsodeliveringusunusuallylargeamountsoffloatperdollarofpremiumvolume.AlongsideGeneralRe’sP/C business,Tadandhisassociateshavedevelopedamajorlifereinsuranceoperationthathasgrownincreasingly valuable. LastyearGeneralRefinallyattained100%ownershipofCologneRe,whichsince1995hasbeena key–thoughonlypartially-owned–partofourpresencearoundtheworld.TadandIwillbevisitingColognein SeptembertothankitsmanagersfortheirimportantcontributiontoBerkshire. 7Finally,weownagroupofsmallercompanies,mostofthemspecializinginoddcornersofthe insuranceworld.Inaggregate,theirresultshaveconsistentlybeenprofitableand,asthetablebelowshows,the floattheyprovideusissubstantial.CharlieandItreasurethesecompaniesandtheirmanagers. Hereistherecordofallfoursegmentsofourproperty-casualtyandlifeinsurancebusinesses:
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